"Taxes, Regulations and Business Structure in the US" joint with Gustavo Ventura
Abstract: Since the 1980s, the U.S. has seen a notable shift in business structure: the output share of pass-through entities (S-corporations, LLCs, partnerships, sole proprietorships) nearly doubled, while that of C-corporations declined. Over the same period, tax policies and avoidance behaviors also changed substantially. Using a dynamic growth model with occupation choice, entrepreneurial risk, and endogenous tax avoidance, we assess the extent to which these factors account for the output reallocation. We find that changes in taxation, borrowing capacity, and tax avoidance account for approximately 43 percent of the observed shift. The results imply that additional mechanisms are needed to fully account for the reallocation.
Abstract: The United States has experienced a significant decline in firm entry rates and entrepreneurship since the 1980s. I document that this decline is more pronounced among married households and men, coinciding with changes in demographic composition (including the share of married households, skilled individuals, and marital sorting) and the rise in female labor force participation. To explore the relationship between demographic shifts and entrepreneurship, I develop a model of occupational choice that incorporates marital status, education, and gender. My findings suggest that changes in demographic composition account for 76% of the decline in entrepreneurship in the U.S.
Abstract: This paper examines how firms responded to a joint policy shock introduced by the 2017 U.S. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), which simultaneously replaced the progressive corporate tax schedule with a flat 21% rate and eliminated the deductibility of performance-based executive compensation under Section 162(m). We exploit cross-sectional variation in pre-reform reliance on performance-based pay and changes in marginal tax rates to show how ex-ante compensation structures shaped firm responses in innovation and intangible investment. We find that, relative to firms with lower pre-TCJA incentive-pay intensity, firms with higher exposure to ex-ante performance-based compensation increased R&D spending, patenting, and intangible investment after the reform—particularly when their marginal tax rates rose. These higher-exposure firms also reallocated performance-based pay away from tax-disfavored executives toward non-eligible executives. These effects are most pronounced in growth firms with high internal funding reliance. This pattern suggests a more complex relationship between executive pay design and intangible investment incentives under tax constraints.
"Entrepreneurship, Inequality, and Redistribution" joint with Hakki Yazici
"Marital Sorting, Joint Labor Supply and the Gender Wage Gap" joint with Terry Cheung and Siyu Shi.